Interview with Alexander B. Downes (Ph.D., University of Chicago, 2004), Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and co-Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the George Washington University.
Professor Downes has written on a variety of subjects in international security, including civilian victimization, foreign-imposed regime change, military effectiveness, democracy, coercion, alliances, and solutions to civil wars.
Downes teaches a variety of courses on IR and international security for undergraduates, M.A. students at the Elliott School, and Ph.D. students in Political Science.
1. What is your view on the latest conflict developments in Ukraine? Will Ukraine withstand the Russian offensive in light of manpower and weaponry shortages?
I think the Russian steamroller will slowly grind on, gradually pushing the Ukrainians back but without making any big breakthroughs. NATO seems committed to providing Ukraine with enough not to lose catastrophically, but not enough to take back the territory it has lost since 2014 (although I doubt simply giving more weapons would do the trick; what’s needed is a major improvement in the Ukrainians’ ability to use combined arms warfare). It is a war of attrition in which neither side can subjugate the other, and in such conflicts the side with the greater resources and manpower typically has the advantage. Putin is perfectly willing to expend massive amounts of manpower for marginal territorial gains. He is currently able to replace his losses and now will get a slight bonus in manpower from North Korea. In my view, Ukraine should stop fighting for every inch of land; it is at a disadvantage in terms of bodies and cannot afford to lose them to defend every village. Form a more defensible line and force the Russians to batter themselves against it, thereby incurring even higher losses. Yes, it will be painful to sacrifice Ukrainian land, but it is more important to preserve Ukrainian lives.
2. Do you think the Kursk offensive had an adverse impact on the Ukrainian military?
In theory, one way to break a battlefield stalemate is to break through enemy lines in a narrow sector of the front and advance into the unprotected rear areas, destroying supplies, equipment, communications, and generally wreaking havoc. Such “blitzkrieg” style offensives, if executed with sufficient forces and/or on multiple axes, can also (threaten to) envelop the enemy from the rear, cutting off its line of supply and retreat, potentially forcing its surrender.
Unfortunately, Ukraine never had the capability to achieve such decisive aims with its Kursk offensive. At best, the incursion might force the Russians to pull forces off the front lines to the southeast and redeploy them to stop the advance. The seizure of Russian territory might also be good for Ukrainian morale and demoralizing for the Russians, and—if held—could serve as a bargaining chip to trade for Russian-occupied Ukrainian territory. But that’s about it. Now, the Russians are slowly but surely taking the Ukrainian-occupied territory back. True, the Ukrainians demonstrated some offensive capability, but now it’s just another front in the attrition war that prevails on the rest of the front. So, in my view, the costs outweigh the benefits.
3. Can Russians possibly deploying North Korean units in Ukraine change the situation on the ground?
The deployment of North Korean units in Ukraine will have little impact on the situation on the ground for several reasons.
First, the numbers involved are a drop in the bucket: 2,000-3,000 now, possibly rising to 12,000. Russia has made little progress with hundreds of thousands of troops, paying dearly for every kilometer or village it manages to take. Adding a few thousand won’t make a difference.
Second, and more importantly, the fighting skill and will the North Koreans bring to the table is questionable. The North Korean Army, with 1.2 million personnel, is the fourth largest in the world. Those of us with long memories will remember that the Iraqi Army in 1991 was the fourth largest in the world, which led many pundits to believe the United States military would suffer high casualties in liberating Kuwait. Yet the Iraqis lacked the skill to operate their equipment and maneuver on the modern battlefield in the face of tremendous firepower because Saddam Hussein purposefully kept his army weak so it could not threaten his rule. In political science terms, it was a “coup-proofed” military, which made it largely toothless in fighting foreign adversaries (versus suppressing domestic enemies).
The regular North Korean Army, I believe, would perform similarly to the Iraqis in 1991 and 2003. Kim Jong Un is a personalist dictator who has killed anyone who could pose a threat to his position as supreme leader. His army is large but has decades-old Soviet-era equipment and is staffed by poorly trained conscripts. It is highly unlikely that regular North Korean soldiers deployed to Ukraine would fight with much skill and determination.
Now, that said, the troops being sent by Pyongyang are special operations forces from the 11th Army, the cream of the North Korean military. They are likely to be more skilled and dedicated than the average DPRK soldier. Yet they have zero combat experience, as North Korea has not fought a war since the end of the Korean War in 1953. These forces are also light infantry, but advancing and taking meaningful amounts of territory on the modern battlefield requires tight coordination among multiple combat arms, something the Russians have shown themselves incapable of doing. Infantry alone, even if skilled, will suffer in the face of Ukrainian fire.
Third, it is unclear how North Korean troops would be integrated into the Russian Army. The most likely scenario is as all-Korean units under higher Russian command authority. Command-and-control is likely to be a challenge given the language barrier, and thus coordinating battlefield movement will be even more difficult than usual.
Finally, the deployment of North Koreans may simply be counteracted by increased NATO military aid.
4. What do you think about Ukraine’s victory plan presented by Zelensky?
The key elements of President Zelensky’s “victory plan” are NATO membership for Ukraine and additional arms from the West to strengthen Ukraine’s defenses now and in the future, including permission to fire long-range weapons provided by NATO deep into Russian territory. The former is not going to happen during the war and perhaps not afterwards, either, depending on the terms of settlement. The latter is reasonable and low risk, and should be granted by the alliance.
The premise of the plan, however, is that Ukraine’s territorial integrity is non-negotiable, meaning Ukraine’s 2014 borders must be restored in any settlement. Given that this is unacceptable to Putin and unachievable by Ukraine, it means a settlement is currently impossible. Putin needs to show some return for the huge number of lives he has squandered in Ukraine, but I think he would settle for limited territorial gains. Ukraine’s limited incursion into the Kursk region notwithstanding, the Ukrainians cannot inflict a decisive defeat on the Russian Army. Eventually, if the war is to end, Zelensky will have to compromise.
5. Should Ukraine seek negotiations (e.g., on a ceasefire) with Russia in light of possible more limited Western aid in 2025?
Yes, the Ukrainian side should seek negotiations with Russia, for three reasons. First, as I just noted, even if NATO aid was to increase, Ukraine would still be incapable of driving the Russians out of all Ukrainian territory. It makes little sense to continue to sacrifice thousands of lives for unachievable goals. Second, as often happens in the world, other crises and conflicts break out, in this case, the war between Israel and Hamas and Hezbollah. Not only does this distract the world’s attention from Ukraine, it is a further drain on U.S. military hardware—Exhibit A being the recent deployment of a THAAD missile defense battery to Israel. Third, it is possible that in a few months Donald Trump will move back into the White House. Trump is a big fan of Putin and not a fan of NATO; he may pull the U.S. out of the alliance and cut off aid to Ukraine. That would be disastrous for the Ukrainian cause. Kyiv would be left dependent on Europe for support, which will not be able to sustain the level of supply that Washington could and may be less resolved to do so. Zelensky must be praying for a Kamala Harris victory, but even a Harris administration would be constrained if, as looks likely, the Republicans control of one or both houses of Congress. In short, Ukraine should negotiate.
6. What do you think is the Kremlin’s ultimate objective in Ukraine?
This is a difficult question. At the extreme, if one believes Putin’s pre-war rhetoric questioning the legitimacy of Ukraine, it would be the subjugation and annexation of Ukraine. I never believed this was Putin’s real objective, and even if it were, I think he understands it is unachievable. It would also be foolhardy, since the Ukrainians would never accept it and would wage a guerrilla war to oust the Russians.
I always believed Putin’s goal was a friendly leader in Kyiv that would not join NATO—along the lines of Victor Yanukovych. This aim implies seizing at least the capital, overthrowing Zelensky, and placing a pro-Russian leader in power. This, too, would likely backfire, given the history of resistance to foreign-imposed regime change, something I have written about, as well as the Ukrainians’ own history of resistance to Russian/Soviet rule. This objective, too, is unachievable.
That leaves territory. Controlling all of Ukraine would provide Russia itself with a buffer against NATO. Annexing the provinces in Eastern Ukraine that Russia currently occupies is a distant second—and certainly was not Putin’s war aim before he attacked—but he may settle for it now, if only to show a profit on the war.
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