Dr Precious Chatterje-Doody is a Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Studies at Open University, UK. Her multidisciplinary research interests centre on questions of communication, perception, identity and security, with a particular focus on Russia.
Her latest book (co-authored with Hutchings Tolz, Crilley and Gillespie) on Russia, Disinformation and the Liberal Order: RT as a Populist Pariah (Cornell University Press, 2023) is now available for open access download. Her previous book (co-authored with Dr Ilya Yablokov) was on Russia Today and Conspiracy Theories: People, Power and Politics on RT (Routledge, 2022).
1. What is your view on the latest war developments in Ukraine?
Ukraine remains under constant attack from Russia, but we're at a potentially very important juncture in the war. Of course, Trump's election to the White House has caused a great deal of speculation about what kind of support Ukraine might continue to expect from its allies, and whether this support will be less unified. So, it has been important for Ukraine to try and maintain its (re-)gained territory to be in as strong a position as possible for any potential negotiations.
Sir Keir Starmer has recently visited Kyiv, where he has made good on pre-existing plans to announce a 100-year partnership between the UK and Ukraine. He had received some criticism for not making the trip earlier in his premiership, though he has hosted Zelensky twice in the UK already and has previously visited Kyiv when in opposition. This partnership announcement is mostly important for signalling intent and commitment and for setting out in an official form the principles behind the UK-UA relationship that might have previously been more implicit. Whilst Ukraine has, I think, been very grateful for vocal British support and advocacy, there is keen awareness that the UK's capacity to support a practical security guarantee is limited and finite. It's also becoming increasingly clear that Ukraine is sceptical of how well Europe as a whole can fulfil such a role, making the role of the US of crucial importance.
2. What do you think about Trump's reelection and impact on the war in Ukraine?
Trump has repeatedly promised that he'll oversee a quick end to the war by facilitating a 'deal' between the two sides. In terms of a preferred outcome, a rapid end to hostilities is really the only thing that's clear - we don't have a good idea of what he thinks this would mean in terms of the people or territory concerned, and it's quite possible that Trump himself is less concerned about such 'details' than about being able to claim his part in bringing about the war's end.
This state of affairs is dangerous for its unpredictability, but it offers certain leeway and opportunities for Ukraine. Since the election results, Zelensky has been extremely proactive in reaching out to Trump and his incoming administration. Instead of making moral claims about what Ukraine should have, he's communicating in transactional terms that Trump will understand. For example, he proposes using frozen Russian assets to purchase weaponry and making proposals about the kinds of contributions that Ukraine might make to European security.
On the surface level, this might be paying dividends. Trump has been making his first real negative comments about Putin, whose approach to the war he says is "destroying Russia" (see here: https://edition.cnn.com/2025/01/21/europe/analysis-trump-putin-ukraine-intl-latam/index.html), and he's also threatened further sanctions in case of non-cooperation. Although it's impossible to predict the specifics of what a Trump-sponsored end to hostilities might look like, it's clear that Zelensky is positioning himself to shape this outcome and try to avoid decisions about Ukraine simply being imposed on Ukraine.
3. What is your view on the success of Russian propaganda and how Ukraine can better counteract Russian information warfare used against it?
As we know, Russia's propaganda is quite extensive and diversified; it tends to be pitched to the prevailing concerns of the different societies and interest groups that it's targeted it. So, as one example, we know that post-colonial societies tend to be targeted with narratives about a hegemonic, hypocritical and morally suspect West, where the war in Ukraine is just a proxy conflict between opposing major powers and their world views. Self-referencing online networks tend to amplify certain core narratives for interest groups such as these. The key issue to remember is that successful propaganda narratives don't come from nowhere. They rely on taking genuine fears, worries or inequalities and then interpreting them in a particular way, as part of a broken system whose failings can't be fixed.
So, I think what's crucial for Ukraine in countering this approach is not to just try and oppose or mirror it - it's pointless to deny problems or inequities that really exist. What's far more meaningful is to proactively create self-standing, positive narratives that fit with the real things that people observe in the world around them. Ukraine has clear commonalities with states around the world that have defended their right to sovereignty against violent colonial powers, and this is the type of narrative that Ukraine has the capacity to make stick.
4. Should Ukraine seek negotiations (e.g., on a ceasefire) with Russia in light of possible more limited Western aid this year?
I feel strongly that it's not for me, as an outsider, to say what Ukraine should do. After all, there is not one objectively correct way forward. Any decisions about negotiations rest on judgements about which factors are most important, what prices are worth paying for different outcomes, and realistically, decisions about what you are willing to give up.
What I can say is that there are good reasons why the prospect of negotiations remains contentious. On the one hand, the war isn't just about territory gained or lost. It's about the lives and safety of the people living in those territories. What kinds of future - if any - can people in occupied territories look forward to if they remain under occupation? What about the generation of children forcibly re-educated and displaced? Many Ukrainians cannot stomach the idea of giving up friends, relatives and loved ones in the occupied territories for lost. However, at the same time, the death toll of the war continues to rise daily all across Ukraine. As this harsh reality sets in, we see an increasing proportion of Ukrainians willing to accept a negotiated end to the war rather than fighting on for a decisive 'win'. The problem is that Ukrainians - and their international partners - have little reason to believe that Russia's leaders will either act in good faith on negotiations or even realistically uphold what is negotiated. The worst-case scenario for Ukraine is that Russia uses a cessation of hostilities to build capacity for a renewed offensive. So, in that respect, no negotiated settlement is viable without cast-iron security guarantees. A quick end to the hostilities might deliver peace in the short term, and it will look good for the incoming Trump administration to broker this. For any peace to remain in the long-term, though, meaningful security guarantees will be the key element of any negotiations that do occur - and agreeing those could prove far more complicated.
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